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January 12, 2005 Thank you for inviting me to address the associates of the Stanford Institute for 
Economic Policy Research; it is a pleasure to be here.  As you know, the U.S. economy is 
currently continuing its recovery from the relatively mild recession in 2001, which ended 
the longest period of economic expansion in our nation’s recorded business-cycle history.  
The 1990s will be remembered not only for this remarkably long period of prosperity but 
also for the excitement of the “new economy” and, less happily, for the sharp decline in 
equity prices that marked its end.  This market correction was most dramatic in sectors of 
the economy associated with new technologies, the very sectors that had experienced the 
most pronounced run-up in equity prices. 
The quick occurrence of a recession following soon after this significant asset-
price correction prompted some observers to suggest that the boom-bust cycle in asset 
valuations was the proximate trigger of the economic downturn  But a number of aspects 
of that argument have not yet been fully examined.  In the interest of advancing the 
understanding on this issue, I will use this opportunity to provide a retrospective on the 
performance of the U.S. economy and of some other industrialized economies during and 
following recessions over the past three decades or so.  In particular, I will focus on the 
role that asset prices may have played in expansions and recessions.
1  Before going any 
further, however, I should emphasize that the views I will express today are my own and 
are not necessarily shared by my colleagues in the Federal Reserve System.   
What Happens during Asset-Price Run-Ups? 
Asset prices serve multiple roles in a modern economy.  They exert a direct 
influence by affecting the net worth of the assets’ owners.  Consumers who hold assets 
become richer during an asset-price advance.  This so-called wealth effect--always a key 
1 My presentation is based on work with Refet Gurkaynak and Athanasios Orphanides. - 2  

determinant of consumption--can be quite important during significant asset-price run-
ups as consumers spend out of their capital gains.  Historical evidence suggests that this 
effect ultimately raises the level of consumption spending by between 2 cents and 5 cents 
per dollar of increase in wealth.
2 
Similarly, asset prices also affect business balance sheets.  Rising prices for assets 
raise the net worth of companies that own the assets.  The value of the assets that a 
borrower owns is an important determinant of his or her creditworthiness.  In the event of 
a default and foreclosure on a secured debt, collateral that caries a high price provides the 
lender with a high recovery rate, which makes lending less risky.  During an asset-price 
boom, the creditworthiness of borrowers rises, the interest rates at which they borrow 
decline because of lower risk spreads, and business investment increases as firms take 
advantage of the relatively lower interest rates they face.    
A consequence of the positive influence of asset prices on investment is that if 
prospects for profitability as reflected in asset prices in one sector of the economy are 
advancing relative to asset prices in all other sectors, investment in that sector will 
outpace investment in the rest of the economy, all else equal.  This circumstance may 
have important and potentially adverse allocative consequences on the economy.  In 
particular, if asset prices do not accurately reflect the productive potential of the 
underlying asset, investment will be channeled to the wrong sectors.  However, an asset-
price boom in a specific sector might simply reflect investor expectations of higher 
productivity rather than a bubble, a term I will define in a few moments.  Investment 
would still tend to be channeled to that sector, but for good reason in this instance.  One 
2 See, for example, Morris A. Davis and Michael G. Palumbo (2001), “A Primer on the Economics and 
Time Series Econometrics of Wealth Effects,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-9 
(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February).  - 3  

example of a sector-specific jump in asset prices and an associated investment increase is 
the case of the U.S. technology sector in the late 1990s.  Over the five years from the end 
of 1994 to the end of 1999, prices of nontech stocks tripled while those of tech stocks 
more than quintupled.
3  Correspondingly, the average level of real investment in 
computers and other high-tech capital goods was more than 100 percent higher over the 
1995-99 period than its level during 1994, while spending on other types of fixed capital 
was only about 15 percent higher than in 1994. 
Asset-Price Busts 
By definition, an asset-price bust is preceded by an asset-price boom.  If a run-up 
reflects a bubble, the ensuing price bust could obviously be viewed as its bursting.  
Alternatively, asset prices may have been driven up by expectations of a productivity 
boom, which would lead to improved earnings.  In that case, if the expected productivity 
boom does not subsequently materialize, asset prices will fall.  The end result in this case 
would not be termed the bursting of a bubble.  Nonetheless, this case may be 
indistinguishable from such an experience:  Among other common elements, one could 
also see an investment overhang in the sector that saw its asset prices rise and 
subsequently fall. 
Recessions are almost always accompanied by asset-price declines.  But such 
declines sometimes appear to be the source of adverse surprises, and asset-price busts 
may subsequently have disproportionately adverse consequences.  Falling asset prices 
create a negative wealth effect and restrain consumption.  By making collateral less 
valuable, they also increase the risk of lending to businesses and thereby worsen the 
3 In this comparison, I use the Nasdaq composite index as a proxy for the high-tech sector and the Dow 
Jones industrials index as a proxy for the nontech sector. - 4  

lending terms faced by borrowers.  When asset prices fall substantially, lenders may also 
find themselves holding substantial amounts of nonperforming loans that are backed by 
what may have become, in some cases, worthless collateral.  For this reason, recessions 
that are preceded by asset-price booms and busts may also be associated with problems in 
the banking industry.  In such episodes, the ensuing loss of intermediation may serve as 
an additional force acting to prolong and deepen what might otherwise have been a 
milder recession.   
Concerns about the severity of downturns that follow significant asset-price 
collapses suggest that the identification and analysis of boom-bust asset-price cycles 
could be useful for policy.  For that reason, I would next like to briefly review some of 
the issues associated with detecting asset-price bubbles.  
Detecting Bubbles 
The word bubble is sometimes employed to describe any quick and large increase 
in asset prices, but a more precise definition would associate bubbles with only those 
increases in asset prices that are not due to economic fundamentals.
4  Under such a 
definition, a bubble is present when investors buy assets at prices above their 
fundamental values in the expectation of being able to sell them at even higher prices in 
the future.
5 To be sure, such departures from fundamentals may start small, but over time 
they could grow explosively.  The fundamental price of an asset typically is defined in 
terms of the discounted present value of the income stream or equivalent services that the 
4 See John H. Cochrane (2001), Asset Pricing (Princeton:  Princeton University Press), p. 402. 
5 Such a bubble would be called a “rational bubble.”  It is also conceivable that bubbles are present 
because some investors are not pricing assets rationally; for an introduction to that notion, see Annette 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), “Perspectives on Behavioral Finance:  Does ‘Irrationality’ Disappear with 
Wealth? Evidence from Expectations and Actions,” in Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2003 (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press), pp. 139-94. - 5  

asset is expected to provide over time.  For stock prices, for example, this is the present 
discounted value of dividends; for real estate, it is the discounted value of the rents or 
services that are expected to accrue to the owner over time.  In theory, the existence of 
bubbles, defined in this way, is possible in standard asset-pricing models and may even 
be consistent with rational, profit-maximizing behavior.
6 
Ascertaining the existence of bubbles in practice is a very different matter.  An 
immediate difficulty is that the theoretical notion of the fundamental price does not have 
an easily measured empirical counterpart.  In part as a result of this measurement 
problem, statistical tests using historical data cannot easily distinguish bubbles from 
failures of the standard asset-pricing model in some other dimensions, or no failure of the 
model at all.  Indeed, for every study of historical data that finds evidence of a bubble, 
often another shows that the findings could be explained by an alternative specification of 
the fundamentals in the absence of bubbles.
7  That is, even with the benefit of hindsight, 
statistical tests attempting to confirm the existence of bubbles in historical episodes can 
remain inconclusive.  
Of greater relevance for policy discussions, however, is not whether economists 
can identify a bubble long after it occurs, but whether the presence of a bubble could be 
detected in real time, when the information might be useful for policy decisions. 
Unfortunately, detection of a bubble, which is problematic even ex-post, is an even more 
formidable task and arguably becomes virtually impossible in real time.  Indeed, in real 
6 See, for example, Jean Tirole (1985), “Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations,” Econometrica, 
vol. 53 (November), pp. 1499-528; and Dilip Abreu and Markus K. Brunnermeier (2003), “Bubbles and 
Crashes,” Econometrica, vol. 71 (January), pp. 173-204. 
7 See, for example, Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi (2004), “Was There a Nasdaq Bubble in the Late 
1990s?” NBER Working Paper Series 10581 (Cambridge, Mass.:  National Bureau of Economic Research, 
June).  They argue that the high level of uncertainty about the future growth rate of dividends of tech firms 
helps explain these firms’ stock prices without resorting to a bubble. - 6  

time, it is not uncommon for economists and market participants to fail to recognize 
important shifts in underlying trends that may subsequently be viewed as the source of 
significant changes in market fundamentals.  Current statistical methods are simply not 
up to the task of “detecting” asset-price bubbles, especially not in real time, when it 
matters most.
8   “Detecting” a bubble appears to require judgment based on scant 
evidence.  It entails asserting knowledge of the fundamental value of the assets in 
question.  Unsurprisingly, central bankers are not comfortable making such a judgment 
call.  Inevitably, a central bank claiming to detect a bubble would be asked to explain 
why it was willing to trust its own judgment over that of investors with perhaps many 
billions of dollars on the line. 
The issue of detecting bubbles notwithstanding, it is of interest to know whether 
recessions related to sizeable asset-price busts differ from other recessions in some way 
that might be important for policy considerations.   
Are Recessions That Are Related to Asset-Price Busts Different?   
Two of the longest periods of economic weakness observed in the industrialized 
world during the twentieth century are often identified with the asset-price busts that 
preceded them:  the Great Depression in the United States and the “lost decade” of the 
1990s in Japan.  In each case, rapidly falling asset prices, exacerbated by banking 
problems, marked the beginning of painfully long periods of economic malaise.  In part 
because of these two experiences, it is sometimes suggested that asset-price booms more 
generally lead to imbalances in the economy, and that asset-price busts and the correction 
8 The difficulty of satisfactorily “detecting” bubbles is well known in the economics literature.  For a 
recent survey see Refet Gurkaynak (2005), “Econometric Tests of Asset Price Bubbles: Taking Stock,” 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-4 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, January). - 7  

of these imbalances lead to recessions that are longer, deeper, and associated with a 
greater fall in output and investment than other recessions.  But what is the evidence on 
this question? 
Additionally, can one make any other generalizations concerning recessions that 
follow asset-price booms and busts and how they differ from other recessions?  To 
address those questions, it is instructive to examine recession episodes in the Group of 
Seven economies since 1970. 
Figure 1 presents a bird’s-eye view of the evolution of asset prices and the 
economy from 1970 to 2003 for three of these economies, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan.
9  For each country, the top panel of the figure shows the evolution 
of an aggregate inflation-adjusted index of asset prices--which consists of an average of 
stock prices and residential and commercial real estate prices.  The shaded areas cover 
recession periods, as determined by the business cycle dating committee of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research in the United States, and a comparable methodology for 
the other countries.
10  The bottom panels show the evolution of gross domestic product in 
9 For uniformity across countries, all data shown in this figure, and data discussed later on, including 
those for the United States, are drawn from international institutions.  The asset-price data have been kindly 
provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  For detailed explanations of these data see C. 
E.V. Borio, N. Kennedy, and S.D. Prowse (1994), “Exploring Aggregate Asset Price Fluctuations across 
Countries:  Measurement, Determinants, and Monetary Policy Implications,” BIS Economic Papers 40 
(Basel:  Bank for International Settlements). 
10 To be sure, business cycle chronologies may differ somewhat depending on the underlying 
methodology. The dates of peaks and troughs in economic activity for the analysis that follows are from the 
Economic Cycle Research Institute.  For the United States, these match the dates determined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  For other nations, the institute’s methodology yields 
dates that are comparable to the NBER dates for the United States, which facilitates comparisons across 
countries.  Recession dating is monthly.  To obtain the quarterly time series used here, we converted the 
monthly expansion/recession phases to a quarterly frequency by designating the cyclical peak (the first 
quarter of recession) as the quarter containing the first full recession month--that is, the month following 
the monthly peak designation. Table 1 shows the dates of all recessions in the sample.   - 8  

 these economies together with a historical estimate of the economy’s potential.
11 
The relationship of asset prices to the economy near turning points shows varying 
patterns (figure 1, top and bottom panels).  In some episodes, asset-price declines do not 
appear to have preceded the recession.  During some recessions, asset prices appear to 
have simply moved sideways, not registering substantial declines at all.  But in other 
episodes, significant asset-price booms and subsequent declines do appear before the 
onset of a recession and continue during the downturn.  For the United States, for 
example, the figure highlights the long run-up and subsequent fall in asset prices before 
the 2001 recession.  The size of these recent movements dominates earlier boom-bust 
cycles in the U.S. economy in this sample.  For Japan, one can see the remarkable run-up 
of the 1980s and its agonizing reversal during the 1990s.  For the United Kingdom, one 
may notice the asset-price boom-bust cycle of the early 1970s followed by the painful 
recession beginning in 1974.  Indeed, these three episodes stand out as perhaps the 
clearest suggestions of an asset-price boom-bust cycle significantly influencing or 
possibly triggering a subsequent recession and recovery.   
How do these three cyclical turning points compare with other recessions?  To be 
sure, such a comparison rests on (1) our identification of these three episodes as the ones 
that appear to have been preceded by significant asset-price booms and busts and (2) 
separating these recessions from the rest.  Such a classification necessarily involves some 
11 Estimates of real gross domestic product (GDP), the output gap, potential output, and real 
investment are from the Economic Outlook database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.  The investment data (shown in later displays) reflect total fixed investment.  In figure 1, 
both actual and potential output are expressed relative to the value of actual real GDP in 1985.  By 
definition, output should equal the economy’s potential--and the corresponding measure of the output gap 
should equal zero--when productive factors in the economy are employed at their normal levels.  Output is 
below the economy’s potential when resources are underutilized and above it when the economy is 
overheated.  To be sure, assessing the economy’s potential with much accuracy is inherently difficult, and 
historical estimates of the implicit output gap are highly imprecise; however, these measures can serve as 
helpful summary indicators in historical comparisons such as those discussed below. - 9  

element of ambiguity, but the three episodes highlighted in figure 1, the U.S. recession in 
2001, the Japanese recession in 1992, and the U.K. recession in 1974, do appear to stand 
out.
12 
We have compared the average path of asset prices around the onset of the 
recession in these three episodes to the average path of asset prices in the other episodes 
in our sample (figure 2, top panel).  The vertical line marks the quarter in which the 
recession began.  The dotted curve shows the average of the three asset-price related 
episodes, and the solid curve shows the average of the remaining twenty-two recession 
episodes in the sample.
13  This comparison suggests that in recessions related to asset-
price busts, asset prices fall before the recession more, on average, than they do in other 
episodes.  This is, of course, as it should be, given our selection criteria for the 
classification of the three episodes.  The more interesting question is whether these 
recessions are different in other dimensions as well.   
Consider, for example, the average paths of estimated output gaps during asset-
price busts relative to the remaining recessions (figure 2, middle panel).  The data are 
centered as they were for asset prices, but the output gap is normalized to equal zero in 
the first quarter of a recession.  As one would expect, the output gap for both groups of 
episodes on average falls after recessions start, but it falls less for the asset-price-bust 
12 There are at least two reasons for the ambiguity in such classifications.  The first relates to how one 
defines an asset-price bust.  The second relates to the dating of cyclical peaks, which, as noted earlier, may 
differ somewhat depending on the methodology underlying business cycle chronologies.  The three 
episodes on which I concentrate my attention are relatively uncontroversial in that the recessions followed 
rather substantial asset-price boom-bust cycles.  But other recessions, which followed milder boom-bust 
cycles, could be added to this list.  Examples would be the recessions that started in 1974 in the United 
States, in 1981 in Canada, and in 1990 in the United Kingdom.  
13 To compute these averages, we first centered the path of asset prices around each recession episode.  
The quarter in which the recession began is marked as zero, and quarters from -8 to +8 denote the 
preceding and subsequent two years.  Asset prices in each episode are normalized to 100 at the quarter 
marking the recession start. - 10  

episodes.  Finally, looking at investment (figure 2, bottom panel), the data also suggest 
that, on average at least, investment, like the output gap, was not affected more adversely 
in the three asset-price-bust episodes.  If anything, these three episodes on average appear 
to be slightly shallower in terms of output losses and investment declines than the 
average of other recessions.   
But the comparisons of the averages provided in figure 2 could obscure valuable 
insights that might be obtained by looking at each of our three asset-price-bust episodes 
individually, as I do next. 
Three Asset-Price-Bust Episodes 
Let us first examine the U.K. recession of 1974.  To put that episode in 
perspective, we present an overview of the U.K. economy for the 1970-2003 period 
(figure 3).  The boom-bust cycle that preceded the 1974 cyclical peak is the most 
pronounced (and, by the way, not just for the United Kingdom but for all of the G-7 
countries).  The large fall in average asset prices (figure 3, top panel) followed the 1973 
74 oil crisis, which is also associated with somewhat smaller asset-price declines in 
numerous other nations.   
We take a closer look at the components of the aggregate asset-price index and 
compare their evolution around this U.K. cyclical peak to their average evolution during 
all recessions excluding our three asset-price-bust episodes (figure 4).  Equity prices 
registered a remarkably sharp decline in this episode.  But arguably a more distinctive 
characteristic of this asset-price boom-bust episode is the swing in real estate prices.  
Residential real estate prices, and especially commercial real estate prices (figure 4, 
bottom panels), also registered rather dramatic declines in this episode.  It may thus be - 11  

surprising that this recession does not appear to have been deeper than the average of 
recessions excluding the three asset-price-bust episodes.  The output gap (figure 5) fell 
along with asset prices before the recession, but the decline was from an unsustainably 
overheated level.  And investment (figure 5) stayed relatively strong compared with other 
recessions.  Despite this episode being associated with rather severe declines in equity 
and commercial real estate prices, no evidence of an investment overhang appears in this 
comparison.   
Next, let us turn to the Japanese experience.  The Japanese economy saw rapidly 
increasing equity and real estate prices during the 1980s (figure 6), a remarkably long 
period of stability and prosperity.  These run-ups in asset prices were accompanied by a 
rapid expansion of bank credit, which was especially important for financing real estate 
purchases.  But asset prices collapsed at the turn of the decade.  This “bursting of the 
bubble,” as the episode is often referred to by Japanese officials, was followed by a 
decade of relative stagnation marked by three arguably related recessions.  Concentrating 
attention on just the first of these three recessions, beginning in 1992, proves insufficient 
to capture the severity of the overall problem.  The detailed comparisons of the 1992 
recession with other episodes (figures 7 and 8) do not indicate unusual weakness 
associated with the 1992 recession.  Rather, the 1990s in Japan are more notable for the 
succession of incomplete recoveries than for the recessions themselves (figure 6).   
The bursting of the bubble importantly shaped subsequent developments in this 
case.  The asset-price collapse hit the Japanese banking system hard, eroding bank 
capital.  The ensuing disintermediation subsequently proved an important impediment to 
the economy’s recovery.  However, the extent of the problem was not fully appreciated at - 12  

the time by policymakers.  Despite steps toward an expansionary policy, the monetary 
easing of the early 1990s was insufficient to mitigate the underlying weakness during the 
expansion from 1994 to 1996.  The continued fragility of the financial system arguably 
left the Japanese economy especially vulnerable to additional disturbances that could 
have otherwise been easily weathered.  An economic crisis in Southeast Asia, coupled 
with a previously planned increase in consumption taxes, resulted in a larger-than-
anticipated drag on domestic demand and set the stage for the recession that started in 
1997.  Following a brief recovery, monetary policy was tightened in 2000, and the third 
recession in a decade followed soon after. 
The Japanese experience offers a reminder of the importance of monitoring the 
health of the financial system and the need to be especially wary of signs of fragility 
following a period of sharp asset-price declines.  It also serves to highlight how the 
behavior of the banking system during the asset-price run-up may influence subsequent 
outcomes.  Lastly, it points to the potentially crucial role played by fiscal and monetary 
policies in recoveries following asset-price-bust recessions.   
Last, let us examine the U.S. recession of 2001 and the subsequent, ongoing 
recovery.  We have prepared the U.S. data in the same manner as in the U.K. and 
Japanese cases (figures 9-11).  The evolution of disaggregated asset prices (figure 10) 
shows that the unusually large changes surrounding the 2001 recession reflected the 
movement of equity prices alone.  Relative to the average episode, commercial real estate 
prices neither fell much during the recession nor rose a lot during the expansion.  And 
instead of declining during the recession, residential real estate prices continued their 
upward trend.  The behavior of real economic activity around the recent cyclical peak - 13 -

(figure 11) suggests a second interesting comparison.  Relative to other recessions, this 
recession was shallow and did not appear to impart an unusual drag on investment, 
despite the sharp asset-price correction. 
Why was the 2001 recession relatively short and shallow even though the 
preceding swing in asset prices was so severe?  In my opinion, two reasons stand out. 
The first regards the health of the financial sector.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
U.S. banking sector faced a succession of challenges:  the savings and loan crisis of the 
early 1980s, the international debt crisis of the mid-1980s, waves of bank failures and 
consolidation, and the need to build capital in response to the adoption of the Basel I 
standards in 1988.  But by the mid-1990s the banking sector had regained a solid footing, 
and regulators were careful to keep it that way.  Prudential regulation coupled with good 
risk management meant that financial firms limited their exposure to risk during the 
boom years of the late 1990s.  This approach paid off handsomely when the asset-price 
break occurred.  Despite the recession, banks remained well capitalized, and their 
strength eliminated the threat of a vicious credit crunch or the risk of fragility in the 
system.   
As a result, the elements that appear to have been so detrimental for the recovery 
of the Japanese economy during the 1990s were absent during this episode.  Following 
the “bursting of the bubble” in Japan, the banking system found itself holding a 
substantial amount of bad loans.  And, as already seen, the woes of the banking system 
turned into a recessionary force in itself, curtailing the recovery.  This comparison points 
to a useful policy lesson:  A healthy financial sector and strong prudential regulation - 14  

during an asset-price boom offer valuable insurance in case the boom turns to bust with 
an asset-price break. 
The second, and perhaps equally important, reason that the recent U.S. episode 
was unusually benign was, in my view, the quick response of policy.  Both fiscal and 
monetary policy were eased quickly and effectively in this episode.  The Federal Reserve 
cut the federal funds rate rapidly to create monetary accommodation and maintained 
conditions of substantial monetary policy ease for a considerable period well into the 
expansion.  As well, the Administration and the Congress took quick steps early in the 
recession to provide fiscal stimulus that helped to prop up aggregate demand. 
Placing the policy response in its proper historical context may be critical for 
drawing the appropriate policy lessons for the future.  Countercyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies are unlikely to have been as swift and strong during 2001 had earlier 
policies not set the stage for such action.  On the fiscal side, the budgetary prudence of 
the 1990s yielded comfortable surpluses at the onset of the 2001 recession that facilitated 
the large fiscal policy easing.  And on the monetary side, the successful completion of the 
last stage on the long path to price stability during the 1990s allowed substantial easing in 
response to the downturn.  As policymakers stressed repeatedly, the prevalence of low-
and well-anchored inflation expectations ultimately facilitates pursuit of such 
countercyclical policy.  A clear lesson emerges from this experience for policy over the 
long haul.  By pursuing fiscal prudence and price stability during booms, policymakers 
greatly enhance their ability to take swift, effective countercyclical action when it is 
needed most.   - 15  

Conclusions 
In closing, let me reiterate some of the key points and lessons I draw from this 
review.  First, as already understood, detecting asset-price overvaluations and 
undervaluations is controversial in hindsight and arguably impossible in real time.  As a 
result, although asset-price booms and busts are often linked to recessions, a clear-cut 
policy response to suspected waves of exuberance cannot be suggested.   
Second, sweeping generalizations regarding asset-price-bust recessions and 
subsequent recoveries are not easily made.  Idiosyncrasies dominate comparisons in the 
historical data.  As such, each recession-and-recovery episode would seem to call for its 
own tailor-made policy response.  
Third, to the extent that comparisons across recessions are informative, asset-
price-bust recessions do not appear to be necessarily more costly than other recession 
episodes.  Specifically, at a macroeconomic level, recessions that follow swings in asset 
prices are not necessarily longer, deeper, and associated with a greater fall in output and 
investment than other recessions.  That said, particular industrial segments and classes of 
investment, such as the high-tech sector in the recent U.S. episode, may suffer 
disproportionately during such recessions.  Also, the health of the financial system, the 
strength of the banking sector, and the ability and willingness of policy to take 
appropriate countercyclical action seem to importantly influence the economic outcomes 
of an asset-price-bust. 
Which brings me to my last point:  Over the long haul, preparation for a potential 
problem seems to be the best course of action.  Prudential supervision and good risk 
management in banking, and the pursuit of fiscal prudence and price stability during - 16  
booms, may ultimately serve as the best insurance for dealing with the inevitable 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Asset Prices and the Economy: Average Behavior around Cyclical Peaks 
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Asset Prices and the Economy: Japan 
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Asset Prices and the Economy: United States
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Investment Table 1 
Business Cycles of G7 Countries
* 
Peak Trough 
United States  1969:Q4  1970:Q3
† 
1973:Q4  1975:Q1 
1980:Q1  1980:Q2 
1981:Q3  1982:Q3 
1990:Q3  1991:Q1 
2001:Q1  2001:Q3 






Britain  1974:Q3  1975:Q2 
1979:Q2  1981:Q1 
1990:Q2  1992:Q1 
Canada  1981:Q4 1982:Q3 
1990:Q1 1992:Q1 
Germany  1973:Q3  1975:Q2 
1980:Q1  1982:Q3 
1991:Q1  1994:Q1
‡ 
2001:Q1  2003:Q2 




France  1974:Q3  1975:Q2 
1979:Q3  1980:Q2 
1982:Q2  1984:Q4 
1992:Q1  1993:Q2 
* The quarterly peak and trough dates shown are based on the monthly business cycle 
chronology from the Economic Cycle Research Institute. 
† This episode is excluded because it begins outside of the sample period. 
‡ This episode is excluded because it coincides with German reunification. 